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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

FEBRUARY, 1917

## THE AUTOCRAT OF AMERICAN POLICY

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THE newspapers of January 9 reported that President Wilson, at his weekly conference the day before with the Washington correspondents, had severely scolded the American Press. It was by no means the first chastisement that the journalists of the United States had received from that quarter, nor is it likely to be the last. The President, it appeared, "was particularly annoyed at the reported statements that he intended another peace note." He regarded such statements as "capable of the most serious damage." He told the shrinking correspondents quite flatly that speculation in the Press about international affairs "had embarrassed the Government in the past and that unless it stopped the country might eventually be drawn into war."

We can recall nothing quite like this since the Lord Curzon of twenty-five years ago—he was then Mr. Curzon, and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and an extremely omniscient young man with an overpowering Oxford manner—used to be represented in the London papers, and without any great exaggeration, as opening his speeches with some such shattering pronouncement as this: "Unless there is absolute silence on the Front Opposition Bench, I can no longer be responsible for the Peace of Europe." Unless absolute silence is henceforth maintained by the American Press on all matters of international politics, and editors

and correspondents and publicists cease their intrusive speculations on questions that are no concern of theirs and that the President alone is competent to discuss, Mr. Wilson, it appears, can no longer be responsible for the Peace of the United States.

Such a claim, such a warning, such an admonition, invites to thought. It is but the latest of many incidents that reveal the extraordinary conditions under which the foreign policy of this country is conducted. They are conditions that are thoroughly and dangerously undemocratic. They combine a concentration of power in the hands of one man and a secrecy in the exercise of it such as, we believe, can be paralleled nowhere else on this earth. There is no need to look abroad to the Kaiser or the Czar or to the sovereigns of the Balkan States for examples of autocracy. We have a very complete specimen in Washington in the person of the President of the United States. When we inveigh against "secret diplomacy" as one of the causes of the European war, let us remember that no diplomacy is so secret as our own. When we talk of the necessity of placing public opinion in control of foreign policy, let us quietly reflect that nowhere is that necessity more potent than in the United States, because nowhere is opinion less informed as to the problems of external relationships or less interested in them or less capable of influencing their solution. When we denounce a dispensation that puts it into the power of one man or a single class or group to hurl millions into war, we ought first to open our eyes and ascertain whether that is not precisely the system under which the international business of the United States is managed or mismanaged.

In all this there is neither intended nor implied any criticism of President Wilson. He happens merely to be the man who at this moment is called upon to direct an inherently faulty organization. It is true he directs it in a manner that exposes its shortcomings in the clearest possible light, and at a time when it is being subjected to a quite abnormal strain. But it is not Mr. Wilson's predilection for surrounding himself with Cabinet nonentities, it is not his impatience of criticism or advice, it is not his naturally dictatorial temperament, nor is it even the accident of these tumultuous times in which we live, that is the essential consideration. The questions that confront us today might be a hundred times less crucial than they are and the Presi-

idential personality might be all meekness and abnegation, and the fact would still remain that our methods of diplomacy, our machinery for handling international crises, are abysmally defective. And they are defective in exactly that characteristic which ought never to infect a democratic polity such as ours. They work in the dark, out of the range of the public view, and to a very great extent independently of popular volition; and they throw upon one man not only a load of responsibility that must often of late have seemed unbearable, but a power of making in secret vast decisions, and of committing the nation without debate to momentous policies, that is good neither for him nor for us and that is altogether subversive of the cardinal principles of democracy.

Take, for instance, just a few of the questions that stir, or ought to stir, public interest and curiosity. What is the present status of the *Lusitania* affair? Rumors of an agreement having been reached have been current for a year or more. But nobody knows what credence, if any, to place in them. Nobody knows whether negotiations are suspended or are still going on. Nearly two years after one of the most dramatic and terrible events in American history there are probably not six Americans in all our hundred millions who are permitted to know whether any settlement has been arrived at, and, if so, what it is. Nor are there any means of finding out. Alone among the Governments of the world, our Government publishes no collection of its diplomatic correspondence. Every other people can discover by reading Blue Books and White Papers or by cross-examining Ministers on the floor of the national legislature how their affairs are being managed and how questions in which they are interested are progressing. We cannot. Our function is merely to close our eyes, open our mouths, and take whatever the President deigns to send us.

Within the last month or so, two boats, the *Marina* and the *Arabia*, have been torpedoed with the loss of American lives and apparently in complete repudiation of the pledges given to the United States Government by Germany last May. What do the authorities at Washington think of this renewal of German "frightfulness"—if, indeed, it ever stopped? What have they done about it? What are they going to do about it? It was the clear meaning and intent of the message which the President read in person to Con-

gress eight months ago that if one more American citizen was killed as the result of German barbarity, diplomatic relations with Germany would be severed. We know that no such step has been taken. But is it being meditated? Or is the President keeping these and other cases in reserve in order to frame one comprehensive and overpowering indictment of Germany later on when some fresh horror has made further hesitation impossible? Even in venturing to speculate on such matters we are conscious of disobeying the Presidential injunction. But some curiosity on a point that may involve the whole issue of peace or war is irresistible even if it is unpardonable. And it is surely an amazing circumstance that the American people should be left wholly in the dark as to what is or is not being done in their name.

Another instance. Mr. Lansing on December 21 declared that "the situation is becoming increasingly critical" and that he meant by that "that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves." If words of graver moment have ever been addressed by a Secretary of State to his countrymen we cannot recall them. Mr. Lansing explained afterwards that he was sorry he spoke them but he has never withdrawn them or sought to minimize their significance. They still stand. But their precise meaning and purpose, the developments on which they were based, the object that the Secretary of State had in view when he uttered them—all these are mysteries that remain unfathomable. In no other country in the world could a Foreign Minister use such language without being instantly called to account. In the United States he receives a wiggling from the President, he furnishes a momentary sensation, people go about their normal business, and the incident is officially declared to be closed before anyone has even begun to understand it.

Again, from the character of the Spanish reply to the President's peace note, it seemed a fair inference that Mr. Wilson had added something in his communication to neutrals that he had omitted from his appeal to the belligerents, and that he had practically invited them to co-operate with him in requesting from the warring Powers a statement of their terms. Whether that is indeed the fact we do not know. But it is difficult to explain the reply that was received from Madrid on any other hypothesis. Here, however, once more the American people are left to the kind of surmises and speculations which the President reprehends.

They are told nothing. They are without the means of finding out anything. They can only guess.

Let us look now at the other side of the picture. The secrecy with which our diplomacy works is only the indication of a more serious defect in the background. That defect is the virtually uncontrolled autocracy of the President in mapping out our foreign policy. It is no new phenomenon. Colonel Roosevelt's Administrations abounded in examples of it. If the dictatorship of Mr. Wilson seems now unusually untrammelled that is only because the issues he has had to deal with have been unusually serious. He gave in the early days of his first term a sharp proof that he intended to be no less the master of American foreign relations than any of his predecessors when, on his own initiative and with hardly even the pretense of consulting either Congress or the country, he withdrew the United States from all participation in the Chinese Five-Power Loan—thus reversing at a stroke both the policy and the principles on which both Mr. Taft and Colonel Roosevelt had worked.

We talk of American policy in Mexico. But what we really mean is Mr. Wilson's policy. What the American people think of Mexico and our duty there is of much smaller practical moment than what Mr. Wilson thinks they think. And it is of no moment at all compared with what he thinks they ought to think. In effect our variegated conduct in Mexico has been imposed upon us by one man who can rely upon the general ignorance and apathy of our people and their readiness at a crisis to "stand by the President" for whatever appearance of popular sanction he may like to throw around his proceedings. In the same way our course of action or inaction during the past thirty months of the European war—can anyone suggest a single factor that had even one-hundredth part as much influence in deciding it as the accident of Mr. Wilson's views and personality? Given a President of another type and a different outlook, and not alone the policy but the whole atmosphere of this country would have fundamentally altered. The power which the President possesses of negotiating with foreign Governments behind the backs of his Cabinet and of Congress, his ability to commit the nation to new courses by a mere *ipse dixit*—just as Mr. Wilson has pledged the American people to support a world-league for the maintenance of peace "with every influence and resource at their com-

mand"—his fixity in office, the difficulty, almost the impossibility of reaching him as the Foreign Ministers of Europe, even of Germany and of Russia, can always be reached, his immunity from effective checks—a President bent on war could easily force Congress to do his bidding—the general feeling that obtains among our people that foreign affairs are no concern of theirs and that the President is paid to look after them, and the almost grotesque incompetence which Congress, and especially the Senate, displays whenever it plunges into international problems—all these are elements in a situation full of possible danger to our Republic and singularly ill-adapted to stand the wear and tear of the next few crucial years.

### ISOLATION AND OTHER POLICIES

"It is the Administration's view that the country can be committed to an abandonment of the policy of isolation, much as President Monroe committed it to the Monroe Doctrine, without Senate action."

The "Administration's view" which we have quoted has been widely interpreted as looking to abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine—the "policy of isolation" and the Monroe Doctrine being regarded as identical. If such were its purpose, it might be said pretty confidently that it could not succeed. It would not be within the power of the President, without the assent of Congress, to abandon the Monroe Doctrine. He could, at most, neglect to enforce it in case some foreign Power attempted to violate it; but even then he might be compelled to vindicate it through a Congressional declaration of war against the offending Power. He could not make a treaty in contravention of it, nor could he abrogate one of the treaties which have been made in recognition of it, without the consent of the Senate; nor could he annul or override one of the acts or resolutions made in pursuance of it without the assent of Congress.

It is, however, a mistake to regard the Monroe Doctrine as tantamount to a "policy of isolation," or to regard this nation as having ever been committed to such a policy, unless we recognize a very marked qualification of the term. If by a "policy of isolation" we understand a refusal to participate in the external transactions of European nations, or to enter into alliances or compacts of any kind, then there

seems to be good ground for denying that any such policy exists or ever has existed in America. If there is, or has been, such a policy, when and where did it originate? By whom was it conceived and promulgated? In what respects has it been practiced? We can find no trace of it in the Declaration of Independence. That instrument specifically asserts that we hold all nations alike "enemies in war, in peace friends," and that we, "as free and independent States, have full power to levy war, conclude peace, *contract alliances*, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do." There is no hint of "isolation" there, but rather a very positive assertion of our equal status as a nation among the nations of the world, competent to participate in any and all international affairs.

Washington and Jefferson are often named as the founders of or advocates of a "policy of isolation," but they were not. Washington indeed warned the nation against permanent alliances with European Powers; but he made it clear that his advice was intended specifically for that time, while the nation was comparatively small and weak, and in the same breath he sanctioned the making of temporary alliances for special purposes. The purport of his exhortation was that we should keep ourselves so separate from the "European system" that we should not be drawn into war whenever two European Powers broke the peace, as we had so often been in colonial times. Jefferson also spoke epigrammatically against "entangling alliances"; but very soon afterward he, as President, advocated a hard and fast offensive and defensive alliance with one European Power for the purpose of waging wars of conquest against another European Power; and a score of years later, in the ripeness of his retirement as the "Sage of Monticello," he again recommended a permanent alliance with Great Britain, in order to detach that country from the Continental system and attach it to the American system; thus opposing the Holy Alliance with an Anglo-American Alliance. That was Jefferson's conception of the logical and most desirable working out of the Monroe Doctrine.

Coming thus down to the Monroe Doctrine itself, which is perhaps most frequently referred to as the basis of our "policy of isolation," and which was commonly supposed to be in the President's mind when he made this recent



suggestion of "abandonment of the policy of isolation," what do we find? There is not a hint of "isolation," either in the Doctrine itself or in the authoritative comments which were made upon it at the time of its promulgation. In the Message of which it was a part, Monroe first expressed an ardent sympathy with Greece in her struggle for independence, and a deep interest in the unhappy condition of Spain and Portugal. Thus, far from assuming isolation, he did not even maintain neutrality. Then he proceeded with the Doctrine:

In the wars of the European Powers, *in matters relating to themselves*, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. . . . With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. . . . Our policy in regard to Europe . . . remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the *internal concerns* of any of its Powers . . . and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every Power submitting to injury from none.

There is no policy of "isolation" there, unless indeed it be isolation for a nation to refrain from being a busy-body and a meddler in matters which are none of its business. It does not comport with our policy to take part in matters relating solely to other Powers. Our policy is not to interfere "in the internal concerns" of other Powers. All that is quite true. But that is not to say that we are not to take part in matters which do not relate solely to European Powers but which affect ourselves as well. It is not to say that we are not to interfere in those external concerns of European Powers which are also our own concerns. Note, moreover, the reference to the "existing colonies or dependencies" of European Powers. Monroe declared that we had not interfered with them, and promised that we would not interfere with them. Yet a few years earlier in his own Administration we had very seriously "interfered" with Spain's colony or dependency of Florida, and years afterward we as seriously "interfered" in Spain's colony or dependency of Cuba. Are we therefore to conclude that Monroe told a falsehood in his Message, and that McKinley—or Congress—in 1898 violated the pledge of the Monroe Doctrine? We should have

to do so if we were "strict constructionists" of the Doctrine. But of course no such construction or interpretation is to be made, outside of Bedlam. Monroe's meaning was that we had not interfered with such colonies excepting when our own rights and interests were invaded or seriously menaced, and that we should not interfere with them excepting for the purpose of vindicating the primal and perpetual law of self-protection. His Doctrine left us perfectly free to take any action which might be dictated by our own rights and welfare. "*Salus Reipublicae suprema lex*"—supreme even above the Monroe Doctrine.

So much for the Doctrine itself, in letter and in spirit. In the Rush-Canning and Rush-Adams correspondence, which preceded and led to it, there was no hint at American "isolation," but rather some very direct and distinct intimations of a prospective alliance between America and Great Britain. Before promulgating the Doctrine, Monroe sought the advice of Jefferson and Madison, and they both gave it, deliberately and voluminously, with never a hint at "isolation." Instead, both directly and emphatically anticipated and recommended the contrary, and approved the Doctrine as a step toward if not the practical achievement of a lasting alliance between the United States and Great Britain. It is true that Jefferson said that "our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe.... America has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and particularly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe." But that did not and does not mean "isolation," any more than it means isolation for one family not to entangle itself in the broils of the family across the street, but to have its own domestic system, separate from that of any other household. To refrain from being a busybody and meddler one need not be a hermit.

Note, however, what Jefferson added in the next paragraph of his letter to Monroe:

One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid and accompany us in it. . . . Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fight-

ing once more, side by side, in the same cause. . . . If we can effect a division in the body of the European Powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it.

In other words, as already suggested, we were to seek an Anglo-American Alliance with which to oppose and probably to fight the Holy Alliance. That was the policy of Jefferson.

Madison's policy was similar, but even more inclined toward participation in what we now call world politics. "It is particularly fortunate," he wrote to Monroe, "that the policy of Great Britain has presented a co-operation for an object the same with ours. With that co-operation we have nothing to fear from the rest of Europe. There ought not, therefore, to be any backwardness in meeting her in the way she has proposed." The way that she had proposed was that of an alliance. But Madison was not content with an alliance simply for our own protection; such as Jefferson had recommended. He went on: "Will it not be honorable in our country to invite the British Government to extend the 'avowed disapprobation' of the project against the Spanish colonies to the enterprise of France against Spain herself, and even to join in some declaratory act in behalf of the Greeks?"

So here was this thoughtful and scholarly "Father of the Constitution" suggesting that we should make an alliance with Great Britain for the purpose not alone of protecting the South American Republics from re-subjugation, but also of intervention—Anglo-American intervention—between France and Spain, and between Turkey and Greece. For while he spoke primarily of mere words of "disapprobation" of France's aggressions upon Spain, and of a mere "declaratory act" in favor of Greece, he recognized the fact that such declarations might imply a pledge to follow them up with war; in which case, he said, "we ought to compare the good to be done with the little injury to be apprehended to the United States, shielded as their interests would be by the power and the fleets of Great Britain united with their own." In short, we were to join Great Britain in an alliance for waging war against France for the protection of Spain and against Turkey for the liberation of Greece! Surely, there was no "policy of isolation" in Madison's mind.

These and other declarations, however, weighty and authoritative as they are, are after all nothing but declarations. Let us turn from them to concrete acts; and particularly to those not merely performed by the President but also approved by Congress, or by the Senate. There were many in our earlier history which were quite incompatible with "isolation," but it will serve to cite a few of recent date, within present recollection. In 1880 we entered with the chief European Powers into a formal treaty providing for the protection of foreigners in Morocco, and in consequence of our having done that more than a quarter of a century later we entered with those same Powers the Conference of Algeciras; and we thus became mixed up in that embroilment of the European Powers which was one of the most direct preludes to and causes of the present world war, and we took a predominant part in defining and regulating the rival interests of European Powers in that African empire. Surely that did not savor of "isolation"; nor was "isolation" implied in the proviso which was appended to the treaty, that nothing in it was to be construed as a repudiation or abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. That proviso was in fact really a declaration that for us thus to mingle in world politics was not incompatible with that Doctrine.

Again, there were the two treaties, or sets of treaties, at The Hague. The United States took a leading part in the making of them, side by side with the European Powers; and they were and are treaties relating not merely to our own affairs but to the general international interests of the world. It was not an empty form for the United States to sign and ratify those treaties, and in so doing there could not have been the slightest trace of "isolation."

Now all this is not to say that we ought to embroil ourselves in purely European affairs, or that we should hastily and needlessly enter into an alliance with any other Power in the world. It is eminently desirable that we should hold ourselves aloof from such things as far as possible. But it cannot be too strongly insisted that the Declaration of Independence is not mere "buncombe" when it says that the United States has "full power to contract alliances"; and that it was not a purposeless and meaningless thing for the Constitution to invest the President with the power to "make treaties" in the unlimited scope of the term. It

may not be expedient for us to enter into alliances. A great authority of old reminded us that things which are lawful are sometimes not expedient. But if at any time it should be expedient, if it should be for the welfare of this country, for us to enter into any sort of an alliance with any Power in the world, there is no "policy of isolation" standing in the way to prevent us from it. If there were, it should be swept away. But there is none.

We hark back, therefore, to the President's statement of a few weeks ago, which has served as our text, and to the first sentence of it which we have quoted: "The United States stands ready to enter any kind of international agreement that may seem most desirable to the nation." That is absolutely sound policy, and it is in perfect accord with the traditional policy and practice of this nation. That was the policy of Washington, and Jefferson, and Madison, and Monroe, as our citations have demonstrated. It was equally the policy of Grover Cleveland and of William McKinley and their masterful Secretaries of State. When Jefferson was convinced that it was for the good of this country to pursue such a policy, he favored friendship with France as against England, but no alliances, and peace at any price. But when the next day he was convinced that, in changed circumstances, the very reverse was for our good, with equal zeal he favored an alliance with England against France, and war on any pretext. In that he may not have seemed consistent, but he was patriotic. He was, moreover, consistent in the best sense, for he was constant and true to the supreme principle of American welfare.

The question inevitably arises, and it is a question of the greatest possible importance, to what extent it is compatible with our welfare, or to what extent our security and our rights and interests require, that we shall participate in the affairs of other nations—that is, in their external affairs, the affairs of world-politics. But that is the only question, and once it is convincingly answered there is no other. Once establish the fact that our welfare requires us to stay out of an international controversy, and out we stay. Once demonstrate that our rights and duties require us to go in, and in we go. The rule is inexorable. It is treason to violate it.

In this view of the case, it is a great responsibility which the President—any President—assumes in committing

the country, as Mr. Wilson says that he can, to any policy, without consulting the Senate as the representative of the States or Congress as the representative of the people. It is a responsibility the importance of which may well overawe any man, even the boldest, and restrain him from exercising it save under the stress of supreme compulsion. There was irresistible compulsion when Washington committed us to the policy of neutrality, when Jefferson committed us to the policy of Continental expansion and of the exclusion of European Powers from America, and when Monroe committed us to the policy of permitting no European meddling with American interests. The crisis which confronts the nation to-day is not less than any of those; it may even be greater than any; and its compulsion upon the President to commit us to some new policy to meet new conditions may be as imperative and as irresistible as any which came upon any of his predecessors. If so, it must be hoped for the welfare of the Republic that he will discharge it with their courage, their resolution, and their wisdom.

### PREPAREDNESS FOR PEACE

"As for me," said Socrates, "all that I know is, that I know nothing." It may of course be that we are too proud to confess ourselves to be no wiser than Socrates. He lived a long time ago, and is dead. Yet it may be well for us, amid all our self-appreciation, not to say bumptiousness, to realize that there are some things which not even we can certainly know, but which, in another classical quotation, are in the laps of the gods.

We cannot, for example, tell either how or when the present war will end; not even approximately. We cannot tell whether the end will come through direct negotiations among the belligerents, or through the mediation of some neutral Power or Powers; or whether it will come as the result of some overwhelming act of conquest such as the success of the initial German drive at Paris might have been, or through the exhaustion and collapse of one of the warring leagues. There are reasons for expecting any of the four; or at any rate reasons for not dismissing curtly any of them as quite impossible. Not one of them would be nearly as surprising as some things which have already occurred.

We cannot, either, declare with any degree of confidence

or assurance at what time the war will end in any one of these ways. The end may come at any time, as suddenly and as unexpectedly as the war began; or it may be postponed for a long time and come gradually and with unmistakable foretokenings. For any time and for any method reasons may be adduced. But reasons, though they be plenty as blackberries, do not dictate fate. The most striking characteristic of this war is and has all along been not its magnitude, nor its ferocity, nor its destructiveness, nor the novelty of the devices and methods employed, though in each of these respects it surpasses all other wars in history. No, it is the manner in which it has denied and repudiated all the most confident expectations and prophecies of the world.

We were all quite sure, in advance, that there would never be any such war, for at least three reasons. One was, that armaments were so enormous and potentially so destructive that no Government would dare to put them into action; but in fact Governments unhesitatingly put into action armaments far more vast and terrible than we had supposed them to be. Another was, that the money-kings of the world, fearing that a war would destroy the very subject-matter of their wealth, would refuse to supply the means for waging it; but in fact they have supplied hitherto unheard-of funds with hitherto unheard-of readiness. The third was, that the vast socialist and social-democratic organizations of the Continent would mutiny in universal strike against a war, and thus paralyze even the most militant Government; but in fact the Socialists have flocked to the colors as eagerly as any others, and former leaders of the social democracy have become the most efficient and inexorable directors of the military campaigns.

We were sure, too, that if a war should occur, it would be very short, for one of at least three reasons. One was, that with such terrific armaments the first general engagement would be decisive; but instead, big battles, far bigger and more terrible than ever had been anticipated, have followed each other for two years in "damnable iteration" without even approximating a decision. The second was, that the drafts of such a war upon the belligerent nations would be so great that exhaustion and collapse would speedily supervene, and we remember how in the first few months of the war it was reported that Germans were sending out

piteous "We are starving" messages written underneath postage stamps where the censors would not see them; but after two years and more exhaustion has not yet come. Finally, we were perfectly sure that, because of the outrage upon humanity, and because of the interference with the peaceful commerce and industries of the world, neutral nations everywhere would unitedly demand and in fact compel cessation of the war; but the truth is that not a single significant step nor offer of a step has been made in that direction.

With all expectations concerning the war thus signally disappointed, there can be no assurance that any prognostications concerning peace will prove to be more fortunate. We do not know how peace will come. We do not know when it will come. And—which is most to the present purpose—we do not know and cannot confidently determine what will be Europe's condition when it comes or what will be its effect upon our own interests. Obviously, all these considerations are linked in a train of cause and effect. The time and manner of peace-making will largely determine what the condition of Europe will be after the war, and that condition will largely determine the effect upon us. An ending now, through mediation, would leave Europe in a far different condition and would produce far different effects upon us, from an ending reached years hence through violent conquest or complete exhaustion.

It would be a great mistake, however, to conclude that all this uncertainty left this country in corresponding uncertainty as to the course which it should pursue, or that it would be impracticable for us to make preparation in advance for events and conditions the character of which we cannot forecast. It is true that we know positively only one thing about the end of the war. That is, that it will mark the end of European demands for warlike supplies, and that therefore all our capital and plants and labor which are now engaged in the production of munitions will find that occupation gone and will have to turn to other activities. That alone will be sufficient to produce a considerable change in our national economics; but for it there need be no special difficulty in making complete preparation. There will, however, be other and perhaps far more important changes, of which we can have no positive advance knowledge and for which therefore special preparation seems impracticable.

There are those who anticipate that immediately upon



the ending of the war the United States will be flooded with immigrants, abandoning the war-stricken lands of Europe and seeking asylum and prosperity here. There are others who are equally confident that nothing of the sort will occur, that every available worker will be needed and will be retained in Europe, and that the demand for labor there, to restore the lands ravaged by war, will be so great that there will be a considerable migration from this country to supply that need. Plausible arguments are given in support of each of these diametrically opposite views.

Similarly there are those who predict that there will be a great mass of European products "dumped" upon our markets, when all the workers now engaged in fighting return to the factories. A great and efficient army will be set at the tasks of peace, and the nations will strain every nerve to produce and to sell as much as possible, so as to make money through commerce for meeting their war debts. Therefore, it is argued, we should enact stringent laws against such "dumping" of foreign products upon our markets. Yet on the other hand it is argued that the war is at once decreasing industrial efficiency by killing and maiming the very best workmen, and is increasing the expectant demand for goods by consuming the supplies on hand; and that therefore after the war European factories will be fully occupied with supplying the domestic demand, without invading foreign markets. Observers of equal authority and information take these opposite views of the outlook.

Now this uncertainty as to the future might prevent efficient preparation if preparation had necessarily to be specialized. If for example, our preparation were to be simply against excessive immigration, or against "dumping," or any other of the various special conditions which various observers expect, we should not know what to do; for whatever preparation we made might prove to be the exact contrary of what was needed. But, fortunately for us, preparation is not a matter of specialization, but may be made on general lines and bases so as to meet successfully any conditions which the return of peace may produce.

We should realize that the most efficient preparation is always, at least fundamentally, that which is general and not special. Thus the best intellectual preparation which schools afford is not a special training but general culture.

It consists in a thorough grounding of the pupil in those principles of knowledge which are fundamental to all professions and occupations and mental activities, and which make the mind, as Huxley expressed it, a clear, cold logic-engine, with all its parts of equal strength and in smooth working order; ready, like a steam engine, to be turned to any work, whether it be to spin gossamers or to forge anchors. We know, too, that the best physical preparation consists not in the high development of special activities, but in a general conservation of sound health and a well-balanced disciplining of all the physical functions such as will make the body an organism capable of doing any kind of work they may be required of it.

Now we should be purblind if we did not perceive not only the possibility but the desirability, so great as to fall little short of imperative necessity, of applying precisely these same rules to the preparation and the activities of the nation. The youth is not certain whether he is to be a lawyer or a physician or an engineer; but in any case he needs to master the Three R's. He does not know whether he will be a farmer or a blacksmith, but in either case he needs good digestion, sound lungs, and nimble and energetic use of his limbs. We do not know whether we shall be called upon to compete with a vast flood of foreign goods poured upon our markets, or to supply the demands of the markets of the world. But we do know that in either case our chief need is to be efficient in production. We may safely assume, also, the need of reasonable protection against "dumping" so far as that is possible through legislation. Then if "dumping" is attempted, we shall be secured against, while if it is not, no harm will be done in the non-operation of the defensive act. We do not know whether there will be immigration or emigration, but we do know that we need immigration laws designed to conserve and to promote the welfare of the United States. It would be madness to say that if immigration did not come at the close of the war, we should open our gates to undesirables in order to invite and to encourage it. It would be folly to fear that if we enacted laws to exclude undesirables we should thus prevent the coming of a desirable class of immigrants.

There is another phase of preparedness for the return of peace which is perhaps the most important of all. That is, unity. If we were preparing for a great foreign war, with

armies and navies, we should instinctively recognize the necessity of united effort. The voice of faction would be hushed. We should all be Americans and nothing else. No less is the need of unity in preparing for the return of peace to the belligerents of Europe, for that may mean the beginning of a great war between us and them, a commercial and industrial war, with merchant ships and manufacturing factories. If it does not mean that we may expect it to mean increased demands upon us for supplying the markets of the world with the goods which the war-disordered nations are unable to supply. In either case we need to compose the disastrous dissensions between labor and capital, which in strikes and lockouts and what not else do so much to impair our economic efficiency. Such things are to the industrial army what mutinies are to the military army.

We need, in brief, to prepare for the return of peace to the world by emulating the efficiency which European nations, and especially Germany on land and Great Britain on the sea, so greatly cultivated in their preparation for war. We do not know when peace will come and our preparation for it will be needed. Neither did they know when war would come and their preparation for it would be needed. But the war came, suddenly and unexpectedly, and in a way that had not been looked for; and its coming found the German Army and the British Navy ready to meet it. The radical difference between preparation for war and preparation for peace should be obvious. It is this: That preparation for war, if war does not come, is unprofitable and useless, excepting as it serves as an insurance against war; while preparation for peace is profitable and useful even before peace comes, and is certain to fulfill its highest usefulness and purpose since peace is certain sooner or later to come. Preparation for war is preparation for an uncertain contingency which we are hoping and striving never to have realized: Preparation for peace is preparation for an assured event which we are earnestly striving to bring to pass at the earliest possible moment and to maintain for the longest possible period of time. That contrast makes it all the more mandatory upon us that we shall prepare for peace with even more care and resolution and completeness than we or any nation would prepare for war.

## THE CASE OF HIRAM JOHNSON

MR. IRVING MARTIN, Editor of the Stockton *Record*, reprints the following from this REVIEW for December:

Three hundred thousand majority for Hiram Johnson for Senator, and less than none for Charles E. Hughes, Johnson's avowed candidate for President! That is the one overpowering fact which dwarfs all explanations, whether of jealous progressivism or of petty pique, and which will hardly be forgotten *when the triumphant idol of California shall seek in Washington association with honorable men.*

—and chides us politely after this fashion:

It is quite possible for even an editor on an ordinary political daily, writing in haste with the compositor waiting for "copy," to use expressions he does not entirely mean, but so famed an editor of so famed a magazine as THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, writing deliberately to appear a month after the event, should be able to pick his words and not be carried away either by passion of a political nature or by misinformation. George Harvey owes an apology to Hiram Johnson for the wording of that last clause, and if there be no other way to ascertain his mistake and his misfit phrase, he should make a special trip to California to find out the truth.

When George Harvey has convinced himself that he has made a mistake, as he will, he should not only journey to Sacramento to apologize personally to Hiram W. Johnson, but he should publish an apology in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW just as prominently as he made the charge. Colonel Harvey's article in other parts shows that he does not comprehend California conditions, and cannot get an understanding without coming here for his viewpoint. His remarks about voting for Presidential electors in a State as a unit show that he does not grasp the California spirit, for here the electors never have had an equal vote, while in most Eastern States they are always the same, all on a par.

But the apparent injustice of the whole article is in the fact that in Kansas, Dakota and Washington he saw nothing strange in Wilson's carrying those States by good majorities while Republican candidates for other offices got tremendous majorities; but in California alone, possibly because it was closer and in the limelight longer, he finds such suspicion as to give expression to the objectionable clause.

Permit us to say to Colonel Harvey that in California some may not like Hiram Johnson personally; many do not like him politically; others may find fault with his methods and policies; but it would be difficult to find a man or any voter who would pronounce him "dishonorable" in any sense. California is far from being a "wild and woolly" State, if it is on the Pacific seaboard. Its peo-

ple will average up to those of any State on the Atlantic; and wherever you find in California the most intelligence, the highest culture, there you will find the greatest confidence in, the most trust for the sincerity and honor of, and the biggest vote for Hiram W. Johnson.

Elsewhere in this number we publish exhaustive analyses of the happenings in California which culminated in the loss of the State to Mr. Hughes and his consequent defeat as a candidate for President. One is from the brilliant pen of Professor Frederick M. Davenport of Hamilton College, New York, an ardent Progressive, former State Senator, nominee for Governor in 1914 and an earnest supporter of Mr. Hughes, whom incidentally he accompanied upon the campaign tour now become famous, thereby acquiring at first hand information of the utmost value for the performance of his present task. The other diagnosis is by Mr. Alfred Holman, the distinguished editor of the San Francisco *Argonaut* and an intellectual Republican leader of the first rank. A more authoritative presentation from either the Progressive or the Republican viewpoint could hardly be obtained. We submit the two exhaustive statements to the consideration of our readers with no comment further than that which bears directly upon the courteous demand of Mr. Martin for an apology from this REVIEW to Mr. Hiram W. Johnson.

Herein we find at the outset occasion for no little reflection of a timely nature. First we must inquire: Is all fair in politics, as in love still, according to all accounts, even though no longer in war as practiced in Belgium and Armenia? That is to ask, in practical fashion, can a man do things with impunity in furtherance of his political ambitions which he could not do in private life without impinging his honor in the estimation of his countrymen? Speaking generally, we suspect that the answer would be affirmative, as deduced from many instances of exceptional tolerance of derelictions on the part especially of those office seekers who happen to be successful.

But while misrepresentation, deceit and even downright lying as between rival candidates of like caliber are readily condoned or at least quickly forgotten, after the event, there is one point at which, so far, the American public has seen fit to draw a sharply marked line. That is where a candidate for the Presidency is concerned. In consequence probably of the extraordinary respect in which that great office

is universally held, betrayal or even reasonable suspicion of betrayal of such an one to serve a selfish purpose has been enough invariably to blast any reputation. There never appeared a shred of evidence and there was never any reason to believe that David B. Hill connived at the defeat of Mr. Cleveland and his own election as Governor of New York in 1888. Any one of half a dozen quite obvious causes sufficed to account for the small difference of a few thousand votes, but the vague doubt remained, to the ultimate undoing of one of the ablest statesmen produced by the Democracy in half a century. We advert to this memorable instance, perhaps we should remark, only by way of illustration and in no sense as comparative with the unique case now under consideration.

The question is not, as flippantly put by Mr. William Allen White, "who killed Cock Robin?" Nor except from considerations of future party management, in which we have no concern, has it do with possible reprisals. The whole matter, from the standpoint of the public, as we have suggested, resolves into a study of the present bearing of personal honor upon accepted political standards. Keeping this point constantly in mind, little difficulty will be experienced in avoiding the confusion which has been created by the innumerable charges and counter-charges and still lingers as a consequence of the very exhaustiveness of the analyses of our most capable commentators.

So it will be seen that, for our present purpose, it makes not the slightest difference who suggested or tried to postpone the ill-advised trip, who first met the candidate or who urged him to do this, that or the other thing. As evidence of Progressive depravity, Mr. Holman's account of burglary at the primaries through the use of machinery shrewdly constructed by Governor Johnson is interesting, but not important. Nor need Professor Davenport's mental shock at the quite obvious effort on the part of Mr. Crocker to retain control of the Republican organization be regarded too seriously.

The one and only vital fact bearing upon the preliminaries is that the conduct of Mr. Hughes himself was irreproachable. Nobody now maintains that he "snubbed Johnson deliberately at the behest of Crocker" or was at any time or in any way even tactless from the viewpoint of a rational human being. Members of the two factions may have had

ample causes for complaint at one another, but none had the slightest excuse for punishing their straightforward, high-minded candidate, unless through some form of distorted or vicious reasoning it was held to be proper that he should suffer, as he did suffer in the end, vicariously.

Whether in the bottom of his heart Mr. Johnson cherished animosity towards Mr. Hughes because Mr. Hughes necessarily declined the impudent suggestion of Mr. Rowell that he declare for Mr. Johnson before the primaries may be a question, but there is no doubt of his willingness to accept assistance after the nomination,—as witness the following telegram:

SAN FRANCISCO, August 30, 1916.

W. R. WILLCOX:

Johnson wins primaries at least fifteen thousand. This with Progressive nomination and votes three hundred thousand supporters not yet enrolled in party guarantee his overwhelming election, even without further effort on his part. Our task now to reunite forces on Hughes and to this if you think I can still be useful I wish to devote myself unreservedly for the remainder of the campaign. Johnson's nomination greatly facilitates this but impossible to undo mischief already done without some overt act from Hughes, which, fortunately, he can now do without embarrassment, having accepted party status quo as determined by organization while in California there be no criticism if now accepts party status quo as determined by vote of people and new State organization which Progressives will now control. Best immediate step would be prompt telegram unreservedly congratulating Johnson and expressing hope for election. I strongly urge you advise such a telegram.

CHESTER H. ROWELL.

Responding to this request, Mr. Hughes performed the "overt act" desired, sent a telegram of hearty congratulations to Mr. Johnson forthwith and received a suitable acknowledgment. Simultaneously, as noted in the telegram, the management of the campaign, along with the very considerable sum of money collected by Mr. Crocker, passed automatically to the new committee headed by Mr. Rowell.

From that day forward to the day of election—two full months—Mr. Johnson exercised exclusive and undisputed control of the canvasses of Mr. Hughes for President and of himself for Senator, with this result:

Majority for Wilson over Hughes.....	3,420
Majority for Johnson over Patton.....	296,815

A difference, in a total of 928,452, of..... 300,235

“ It may seem idle,” writes Professor Davenport, “ to go into the question of whether Johnson and his organization, after winning a victory at the primaries, were loyal to Hughes thereafter to the end.”

With all due respect to our esteemed contributor, it may seem idle or even highly desirable to a Progressive leader, but not to us in our present inquiry, for the reason that in the answer to this very question is to be found the crux of the whole matter as it relates to political standards as affected by personal honor. We had in mind but the one query, Did Mr. Johnson betray Mr. Hughes? but Professor Davenport inferentially and perhaps unconsciously raises another, namely, Assuming that Mr. Johnson was not “ loyal ” to, or frankly *did* betray, Mr. Hughes (a matter of so slight importance that inquiry “ may seem idle ”), was his action justifiable? To the latter, we answer unhesitatingly in the negative.

Consider the circumstances. Shortly after the national conventions, and yet not so soon thereafter as to prevent the weighing of personal advantages, Mr. Johnson voluntarily pronounced Mr. Hughes his candidate, promised his unqualified support and obtained from Mr. Hughes public expression of his gratification and gratitude. Again when he had been nominated for Senator, as we have seen, Mr. Johnson sought and secured the aid of Mr. Hughes and assumed sole charge of the campaign in their joint behalf. From that day forward Mr. Hughes surely did nothing to merit the displeasure of Mr. Johnson and, of course, could have done nothing to evince mistrust of his loyalty without impugning his integrity. Of all men living Mr. Hughes, as everybody knows, is the last who would pass such a reflection upon one to whom he had accorded full faith and confided with complete confidence the fortunes of his party and of himself. It is quite impossible to find justification for betrayal, desertion or even lukewarmness in wanton disregard of a trust such as this from such a man.

But did Mr. Johnson betray Mr. Hughes? Professor Davenport, while giving less attention to this specific phase of the subject than we should like, apparently thinks not. Mr. Holman, on the other hand, speaking with full understanding of his own high position and unblemished reputation as the foremost independent journalist of the Far West and with no less certain appreciation of both the effect of



his words and of the grave responsibility which he assumes, declares from his intimate knowledge of all that took place:

“ It was the deliberate treachery of Governor Johnson and Mr. Rowell which lost Mr. Hughes the electoral vote of California.”

Whether the array of evidences adduced by Mr. Holman, with a force of logic and convincingness which we have to confess tends to relegate Professor Davenport's lively sketch to the entertainment class, fully establishes this stern and damning conclusion, our readers are quite competent to determine for themselves. For ourselves, we go only so far as to record a profound conviction that, whether Mr. Johnson did or did not connive directly at the defeat of Mr. Hughes in California, Mr. Johnson could have carried the State for Mr. Hughes with comparatively little effort and could have won for him a very substantial majority by putting forth all his energies. Furthermore, we are fully convinced that there is not a Progressive in California from Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rowell up or down the moral scale who does not in the back of his head coincide in that opinion.

Reverting now to the demand of the *Stockton Record* for an apology from this REVIEW, we readily concede that “ wherever in California you find the most intelligence and the highest culture,” *i. e.*, for example, San Francisco, where Mr. Johnson is most potent, you will find “ the biggest vote for Hiram W. Johnson,” and incidentally the smallest vote for Mr. Hughes. Whether we fail to “ grasp the California spirit ” which impels citizens to discriminate between automations of the Electoral College is probably less to the point than our inability to comprehend the bigotry or pettiness which induces such stupidity. As for the high standing of Mr. Johnson in his own community and the difficulty of finding a single “ man or voter ” who would pronounce him dishonorable, we would not feel warranted in saying more than Mr. Alfred Holman has politely intimated.

Is not the whole question, as we suggested at the outset, one of standards such as occasionally take form in a species of code among gentlemen? Some years ago a great ship struck an iceberg and went to the bottom of the ocean. The captain and nearly all of the officers perished, but the owner who was really responsible for the appalling risk taken was among the first saved. He still lives, strong, well and rich, but a Pariah on the west coast of Ireland, to whom no honor,

able man will extend a hand or speak a word in greeting,—which simply goes to show that in some walks of life, if not in American politics, it is really better and more satisfying in the end to go down with one's ship and one's captain.

Finally, it is not we, but the distinguished editor of the Stockton *Record* who is lax in "picking words." We never applied the term "dishonorable" to Mr. Hiram W. Johnson. We merely wondered mildly whether that little difference of 300,000 out of 900,000 votes would be recalled when in Washington he "shall seek association with honorable men." It may be, if we may paraphrase Professor Davenport, an idle speculation, but it is not devoid of interest and we shall hold to it for the present.

There will be no apology. Rather let us congratulate Mr. Irving Martin, Editor of the Stockton *Record*, whose proprietor, we understand, is a State Water Commissioner by appointment of Governor Johnson, upon having won the following high commendation of his earnest endeavors in the recent campaign:

MY DEAR MR. MARTIN: To you and to the Stockton *Record* I want to express not only my appreciation, but my deep sense of obligation for your constant, consistent and able advocacy of that for which I stand. . . . The loyalty of papers like yours . . . and of men like you . . . contributing so much to the result, have my heartfelt thanks.

Very sincerely,

(Signed)      HIRAM JOHNSON.

Whether or not Editor Martin received a like appreciation from "Cordially and Sincerely Yours, Woodrow Wilson," whom also he supported with might and main, we are not informed. In any case, there is no call for reparation, since the Seattle *Star* "advises" us authoritatively and peremptorily that "Hiram is a gent of strong peculiarities who does not require association with anybody, honorable or otherwise, to have a good time." So, without compunctions of conscience, we shall patiently abide events.